Writing · Book review
Review: "Feeling and Knowing" by Antonio Damasio
Also published on Substack ↗
Damasio attempts to address the hard problem of consciousness—and, more broadly, consciousness itself—by demystifying it and situating it within an evolutionary framework in which complexity increases, and life develops new mechanisms for survival. Consciousness is examined from the perspective of its physical substrate, the body, without the usual reduction to the nervous system, allowing us to explore the structural conditions necessary and sufficient for its emergence.
The title of the essay, “Feeling and Knowing,” fairly accurately conveys Damasio’s definition of consciousness: a state of mind enriched by a visceral feeling that provides specific knowledge of the reciprocal belonging between the body—the source of these sensations—and the mind that feels and knows.
To reach this conclusion, Damasio traces a genealogy of intelligence back to the earliest stages of life, where it is still purely implicit and homeostatic in single-celled organisms capable of sensing (detecting or perceiving) but not yet of feeling (experiencing emotions), through the evolution toward a nervous system indispensable for the coordination of a complex, differentiated organism, which extends this intelligence and makes it explicit by translating bodily and neural signals into maps and images—among which those of our inner world, our feelings, provide the mind with information about the success of its ability to survive.
According to Damasio, the mind of a living organism equipped with a nervous system is composed of mental maps or images representing the organism’s objects, actions, and surroundings. Three major sensory systems contribute to the formation of these maps: the interoceptive system for the internal world, the exteroceptive system for the external world, and the proprioceptive system for the body’s position in space. Each of these systems sends signals that are processed by the central nervous system. The interoceptive system, in particular, produces a mixture of somatic and neural signals due to two characteristics: the near-total absence of myelin sheaths around most of these neurons and the absence of a blood-brain barrier. Under these conditions, somatic and neural signals can interact directly. And the interoceptive system, embedded within the body that generates these signals, can also act upon it through corrective actions to maintain or restore homeostasis. Damasio tells us that although the mechanisms by which chemical and electrical processes are transformed into mental states are not yet clear, it is indeed this blend of neuro-bodily signals and this continuous dynamic between the interoceptive system and the body that gives rise to feelings—in other words, consciousness.
Feelings are, in short, the maps of our inner world that give us conscious awareness of life within the body, the success of its ability to survive. The maps of other systems—perceptions through our senses, for example—are not conscious unless feelings accompany them. In a sense, then, we constantly receive and process signals, but we can only be conscious of what affects us.
Damasio addresses the differences between consciousness, wakefulness, integration, and the mind, in order to better isolate consciousness and clear any confusion. He also discusses the utility of consciousness in humans and in social insects, which are thought to have developed their strategies in part thanks to consciousness. He also examines alternative states of consciousness, such as those induced by anesthetics or narcotics, to reinforce the argument that feelings lie at the heart of consciousness.
It would appear that the ideas and hypotheses put forward by Damasio are not unanimously accepted; however, his arguments are very well presented and defended, and are hard to counter without a solid grasp of the subject. One criticism that could be raised, however, is the lack of clear definitions when he takes liberties with his terminology.
Damasio often alludes to a systemic approach without actually addressing it in depth. This was certainly not the book’s objective, but we are left wanting more details. Admittedly, consciousness arises from a dynamical interaction between the interoceptive system and the body, but no hypothesis is put forward regarding the nature of these dynamics. He argues that consciousness is a systemic problem rather than a physical one. Still, we ultimately come away with a better understanding of the physical aspect and an insufficient understanding of the systemic one.
In addressing the “hard problem,” he does not delve into the various arguments. Instead, he focuses on demystifying consciousness by clarifying what it is—and what it is not—and the indispensable role it plays. But as he describes actions and processes that are triggered automatically and unconsciously, it is difficult to see the need for others that require consciousness. For greater creativity? Faster learning on an individual level rather than over several generations? What levels of complexity are actually required for consciousness to emerge?
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